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In October 2010, the Board of Taxation released a Discussion Paper titled 
Review of the Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance. Since the release of 
this Discussion Paper, there has been no legislative reform in Australia to 
accommodate Islamic finance products. In the Discussion Paper, the Board 
reviews the taxation treatment of Islamic finance products, such as 
murābaḥa. Murābaḥa is known as ‘cost plus profit financing’ and involves 
the sale of a commodity by a financial intermediary to a purchaser at a cost 
plus mark-up profit rate. The Board argues that in order for a murābaḥa 
product to be treated equally to a conventional product for Australian 
taxation purposes, the profit mark-up component common to murābaḥa 
transactions must be treated as if it were interest. However, the Board does 
not consider the implications for Muslims if the murābaḥa profit mark-up is 
treated as interest. The objective of this article is to investigate the following 
two questions: can murābaḥa be viewed as Sharīʿa-compliant by Muslims if 
mark-up is treated as if it were interest; and, if murābaḥa is viewed by 
Muslims as no longer Sharīʿa-compliant, could this cause Australia to 
become less attractive for Muslim investors? This article will undertake a 
comparative analysis by examining the implications of treating murābaḥa 
mark-up as if it were interest from various Australian and UK perspectives. 
This article argues that before legislative amendments are introduced to 
cater for Islamic finance products, further research is needed on the Sharīʿa-
compliant nature of Islamic finance products such as murābaḥa. 
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I INTRODUCTION  
In October 2010, the Board of Taxation (‘the Board’) released a Discussion 
Paper titled, Review of the Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance (the 
‘Discussion Paper’).1 This Discussion Paper responded to a recommendation 
by the Australian Financial Centre Forum (AFCF) that the Board undertake a 
review of the taxation treatment of Islamic finance products in order to ensure 
that they are treated equally to ‘conventional’ financial products.2 The AFCF is 
a joint government-industry partnership set up to progress the government’s 
desire to position Australia as a leading financial services centre in the region. 
This article focuses on the Board’s discussion of the Islamic transaction known 
as murābaḥa3 (the nature of which is explained below) because it is the most 
commonly used Islamic finance product.4 The article will explain the Board’s 
view that in order for a murābaḥa product to be treated equally to a 
conventional product, the profit mark-up component common to murābaḥa 
transactions must be treated as if it were interest for tax purposes. 
There are two issues in particular that this article investigates: 1) can murābaḥa 
be viewed as Sharīʿa-compliant by Muslims if mark-up is treated as if it were 
interest; and 2) if not (that is, if murābaḥa is viewed by Muslims as no longer 
Sharīʿa-compliant) could this cause Australia to become less attractive for 
Muslim investors? This article will address these questions by, first, explaining 
the term ‘Sharīʿa-compliant’, the theory behind Islamic banking and finance, 
and the prohibition of ribā5 under Islamic law. Under the heading ‘Tax 
Considerations’, this article will then explain murābaḥa financing and the way 
it is implemented in Australia. This will lead to a summary of the Board’s 
approach to murābaḥa. Finally, under the heading ‘Present Discourse on the 
Treatment of Murābaḥa’ the implications of treating murābaḥa mark-up as if it 
were interest will be discussed from the various perspectives of Australian 
1 Australian Government, Board of Taxation, Review of the Taxation Treatment of Islamic 
Finance, Discussion Paper (2010) (‘Discussion Paper (2010)’.  
2 Australian Financial Centre Forum, Australia as a Financial Centre, Report (2009), 71 [3.6]. 
3 This article uses the Arabic transliteration system in: Wilferd Madelung and Farhad Daftary 
(eds), Encyclopedia Islamica: System of Transliteration of Arabic and Persian Characters (17 
March 2013) BrillOnline Reference Works <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/ 
encyclopaedia-islamica/system-of-transliteration-of-arabic-and-persian-characters-
transliteration>. 
4 Abdullah Saeed, ‘Islamic Banking in Practice: A Critical Look at the Murabaha Financing 
Mechanism’ (1993) 1 Journal of Arabic, Islamic & Middle Eastern Studies 59, 61.  
5 Usury or interest. Ribā is explained in more detail below. 
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financial institutions and related bodies in comparison to financial institutions 
in the United Kingdom.  
II SHARĪʿA-COMPLIANCE 
At a theoretical level, Islamic banking and finance products are considered 
Sharīʿa-compliant by Islamic scholars if they follow the principles of Islamic 
law or Sharīʿa. Sharīʿa literally means ‘the way’ and Muslims believe that 
Sharīʿa provides ‘the way’6 or guidance as to how Muslims should live and 
conduct their lives. Sharīʿa law governs the day-to-day lives of people as well 
as forming the basis of a political, legal, economic and social system that 
Islamic countries often adopt.7 Primarily, Sharīʿa law is derived from the 
Qur’an, the holy book revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, who was the last 
messenger of Islam, and the sunna, a compilation of the actions and words of 
the Prophet Muhammad as recorded by his followers (individually called the 
ḥadīth).8 Sunni Muslims, compromising 80–90 per cent of Muslims, believe in 
four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, namely Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki and 
Hanbali.9 These four schools of jurisprudence were developed10 200 years after 
the death of the Prophet in order to analyse and interpret Sharīʿa law in light of 
human need and make rulings on issues that were unclear in the primary sources 
of Sharīʿa law.11 The process through which Sharīʿa law is understood is called 
fiqh, which is literally defined as ‘understanding’.12 There are various methods 
by which Sharīʿa law is interpreted and legal rulings (fatāwā) are made by 
Islamic scholars, including: consensus (ijmāʿ), analogy (qiyās), independent 
reasoning (ijtihād), equity (istihsān) and public interest (maṣlaḥa).13  
In the context of Islamic finance products, financial institutions commonly 
establish Sharīʿa Supervisory Boards (SSBs): Sharīʿa advisory boards for the 
6 Frank E Vogel and Samuel L Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk and Return 
(Kluwer Law International, 1998) 23. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Farooq A Hassan, ‘The Sources of Islamic Law’ (1982) 76 American Society of International 
Law 69. 
10 The four schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam were developed by Islamic scholars Abu 
Hanifa an-Nu’man, Malik Ibn Anas, Muhammad ibn Idris ash-Shafi’i and Ahmad Ibn Hanbal. 
There is also the Zahiri school of thought, which is only followed by a minority and was 
founded by Dawud ibn Khalaf al-Zahiri. See generally, Wael B Hallaq, An Introduction to 
Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 31–7. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Vogel and Hayes, above n 6, 24. 
13 Ibid. 
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purpose of overseeing compliance with Sharīʿa. For example, the Islamic Bank 
of Britain has an SSB consisting of Islamic scholars and experts on Islamic 
finance.14 Specifically, the SSBs seek to ensure that Islamic finance products 
comply with Sharīʿa law and, if the products are compliant, they are known as 
Sharīʿa-compliant products. Typically, an SSB is comprised of a minimum of 
three to five Islamic scholars who endorse the products as being Sharīʿa-
compliant after consulting with each other.15 The Sharīʿa-compliant products 
are also audited by the SSBs annually in order to ensure that the products 
remain Sharīʿa-compliant.16   
III ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE THEORY 
The main difference between conventional and Islamic finance products is that 
it is claimed that the latter are free of ribā. Further, there are several other 
qualifications that should be satisfied before an Islamic finance product is 
viewed as Sharīʿa-compliant. For example, Islamic finance transactions are 
generally based on a certain and identifiable underlying asset.17 This is due to 
the fact that uncertainty (gharar) and gambling (maysir) are also prohibited. 
This means that all the terms and conditions of, and any risks flowing from, 
transactions must be clearly understood by the transacting parties. Items with 
uncertain existence cannot form the subject of a contract under Sharīʿa law. 
Examples of such uncertain transactions include gambling contracts, the sale of 
goods of unknown value, and the sale of goods which are not yet in one’s 
possession.18 Furthermore, money flowing from Islamic finance products can 
only be invested in industries that are Sharīʿa-compliant. Investments in the 
alcohol, pornography, gambling and pork industries, for example, are 
prohibited under Sharīʿa.19   
14 Islamic Bank of Britain, Sharia Supervisory Committee <http://www.alrayanbank.co.uk 
/useful-info-tools/islamic-finance/sharia-compliance/>. 
15 The process through which the SSBs endorse and audit Islamic finance products is further 
explained in Maria Bhatti and Ishaq Bhatti, ‘Development of Legal Issues of Corporate 
Governance for Islamic Banking’ in Mohamed Ariff and Munawar Iqbal (eds), The 
Foundations of Islamic Banking: Theory, Practice and Education (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2011) 87. 
16 See generally Hichem Hamza, ‘Sharia Governance in Islamic Banks: Effectiveness and 
Supervision Model’ (2013) 6(3) International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance 
and Management 226. 
17 Shayerah Illias, ‘Islamic Finance: Overview and Policy Concerns’ CRS Report for Congress: 
Islamic Finance: Overview and Policy Concerns (2008) 2.  
18 See generally, Vogel and Hayes, above n 6, 88–91.  
19 Illias, above n 17, 2.  
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A Prohibition of Ribā 
In the Qur’an, the term ‘ribā’ is mentioned several times. The earliest verse 
referring to ribā in the Qur’an was revealed to the Prophet in Makkah around 
614 AD:20  
and, whatever you may give out in ribā so that it may increase through other 
people’s wealth, does not increase in the sight of God; but whatever you give 
by way of charity seeking God’s pleasure, will receive manifold increase.21  
The second ribā verse was revealed in Madinah eleven years after the first 
condemnation in Mecca: ‘O Believers! Do not consume ribā, doubling and 
redoubling, and fear God so that you may prosper.’22  
The definition of ribā is essential to understanding murābaḥa and other Islamic 
finance products. Arabic words in the Qur’an come from root letters that have 
a meaning in themselves. The root letters of the term ribā are ‘Ra-Ba-Waw’.23 
The meaning of these letters put together is ‘to grow, increase or prosper’.24 
Many scholars argue that, in the context of Islamic finance, this means the 
practice of usury or the taking of interest.25 Whether ribā should be defined as 
‘interest’ or ‘usury’ is the subject of growing debate. The roots of usury can be 
traced back four thousand years and the practice is prohibited in various 
religions, including Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism.26 Usury is 
distinguished from the taking of interest as follows, ‘[m]ost nations continue to 
regulate usury, which is now, in the West, defined as contracting to charge 
20 Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest (EJ Brill, 1999) 20.  
21 The Holy Qur’an, English Translation (Chapter 30, Verse 39) <http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/ 
religious-texts/quran/verses/030-qmt.php>. 
22 Ibid (Chapter 3, Verse 130). 
23 In Arabic script, the letters are و-ب-ر 
24 Fazlur Rahman, ‘Riba and Interest’ (1964) 3 Islamic Studies 1. 
25 See, eg, Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (Kluwer Law 
International, 2002); Academy, Islamic Development Bank and Islamic Fiqh, Resolutions and 
Recommendations of the Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy 1985–2000 (Islamic Research 
and Training Institute, 2000); Mahmoud El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and 
Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Mohamad Akram Laldin, Mohamed Fairooz 
Abdul Khir and Nusaibah Mohd Parid, ‘Fatwas in Islamic Banking: A Comparative Study 
Between Malaysia and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries' (2012) Research Paper 31 
International Shari'ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance 1. 
26 See generally Constant J Mews and Ibrahim Abraham, ‘Usury and Just Compensation: 
Religious and Financial Ethics in Historical Perspective' (2007) 72(1) Journal of Business 
Ethics 1. 
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interest on a loan without risk to the lender at an interest rate greater than that 
set by the law.’27  
Mallat accurately notes: 
If [r]ibā is understood to mean simply usury, then, as long as interest rates 
have not hit unusual ceilings, all transactions conducted in society are valid. 
But if [r]iba is in essence defined as interest, then the whole civil and 
commercial structure of society becomes tainted with illegality.28 
1 Qur’an 
A literal reading of Qur’anic verses allows most Islamic scholars to agree that 
ribā is clearly prohibited. Tabari (923 AD), one of the most famous 
commentators on the Qur’an, comments on this verse, saying that it refers to 
the way ribā was ‘consumed’ before the Prophet Muhammad introduced the 
religion of Islam to the Arabs:  
one of them would have a debt repayable by the debtor at a specific date. 
When the maturity comes the creditor would demand repayment from the 
debtor. The latter would say, “Defer the repayment of my debt, I will add to 
your wealth.” This is the ribā which was doubled and redoubled.29  
Thus, Tabari argues that the doubling and redoubling of the principal amount 
borrowed would lead to an unjust result for the borrower who would owe the 
lender four times more than what was lent at the outset.30 
The form of ribā described above refers to a practice known by Muslims as ribā 
al-jahiliyyah.31 Ibn Hanbal, founder of the Hanbali school of Islamic 
jurisprudence, argues that this was the form of ribā condemned in the Qur’an 
when it was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad.32 Classical Qur’anic 
commentary, such as that developed by Zamakhshari (d 1144) and Ibn Kathir 
27 Norman Jones, ‘Usury’ in Robert Whaples (ed), E H Net Encyclopedia (Economic History 
Services, 2008) <https://eh.net/encyclopedia/usury/> quoted in Muhammad Ayub, 
Understanding Islamic Finance (John Wiley & Sons, 2007) 54.  
28 Chibli Mallat, ‘The Debate on Riba and Interest in Twentieth Century Jurisprudence’ in Chibli 
Mallat (ed), Islamic Law and Finance (Graham & Trotman, 1988) 69.  
29 Abdullah Saeed, ‘The Moral Context of the Prohibition of Riba in Islam Revisited’ (1995) 
12(4) American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 496, 500. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid 501. 
32 Vogel and Hayes, above n 6, 73.  
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(d 1373), share this view.33 On the other hand, al-Jassas (d 981) defines ribā as 
the lending of money at a ‘predetermined sum over the principal amount’.34 
Since the Qur’an provides limited commentary on the meaning of ribā, many 
scholars turn to the sunna or the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, which is 
the second major source of Sharīʿa for Muslims. 
2 Sunna 
The tradition of the Prophet Muhammad (sunna) is the second main source of 
Sharīʿa and the sunna is often recorded in the form of ḥadīth. The ḥadīth refers 
to two types of ribā: ribā al-fadl and ribā al-nasiah. Ribā al-fadl is based on 
the saying of the Prophet Muhammad:  
Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barely [sic], dates 
for dates, and salt for salt should be [exchanged] like for like, equal to equal, 
hand to hand. If types [of the exchanged commodities] are different, then sell 
them as you wish, if they are [exchanged] on the basis of a hand-to-hand 
transaction.35  
This saying, also referred to as the ‘six commodity ḥadīth’, prohibits the sale 
of ‘interest of excess’ (ribā al-fadl).36 This means that commodities should be 
exchanged for cash as opposed to barter because there are differences in quality 
when barter takes place.37 The Prophet prohibited ribā al-fadl in order to ensure 
that no exploitation took place.38 There are a number of ḥadīth dealing with 
ribā al-fadl, whereas there are relatively few ḥadīth dealing with ribā al-
nasi’ah, also known as deferred payment or interest of waiting. Ribā al-nasi’ah 
stems from the root word nasa’a meaning to postpone, defer or wait.39 The 
waiting period refers to the time that a borrower is allowed to repay the loan. 
Ribā al-nasi’ah is the fixed amount that the borrower has to pay back which 
consists of the principal amount as well as an additional amount which a bank 
receives as a reward for waiting.40 The contemporary scholarly debate 
33 Raquib Zaman, ‘Riba and Interest in Islamic Banking’ in Mohamed Ariff and Munawar Iqbal 
(eds), The Foundations of Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar, 2011) 223. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Sahih Muslim, 5:44 as quoted in Saeed, ‘The Moral Context of the Prohibition of Riba in Islam 
Revisited’, above n 29, 507–8. 
36 This article does not discuss the legal rulings surrounding this ḥadīth. For a detailed 
explanation, see Saeed, ibid 496.  
37 Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice 
(Vanguard Books, 2008) 55–6.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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regarding the similarities between ribā al-fadl and ribā al-nasi’ah and modern 
day interest centres on how the term ‘ribā’ is interpreted. The methodology 
involved in the interpretation of the Qur’an is a long and complex topic that is 
beyond the scope of this article. However, two methods of interpretation of the 
term ribā in the Qur’an are discussed here, literal and contextual. 
3 Literal Interpretation 
Those who read the Qur’an literally generally overlook the context in which 
verses about ribā are revealed. Ayub takes this approach:  
ribā includes both usury and interest as used in modern commercial 
terminology. The word “interest” by and large has now been accepted and is 
understood as ribā. Conventional banks’ loan transactions carrying interest 
involve both ribā al-nasiah and ribā al-fadl — an extra amount of money is 
paid at the time when payment becomes due as per the loan contract.41 
Similarly, Justice Wajihuddin Ahmad, member of the Shariat Appellate Bench 
of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, states: ‘ribā in Islam encompasses every 
return and all excess arising purely in consideration of time allowed for the use 
of money or of any other thing of value lent’.42  
An interpretation that all return and excess is ribā can lead to the conclusion 
that the entire Islamic finance industry is based on ribā because, as will be seen, 
most Islamic finance products include commissions and fixed fees.43 Profit 
mark-up, commission and fixed fees are viewed by literalists as an addition 
over the principal.44 Literalists include contributors to the Islamic finance 
industry from the 1950s to the 1980s.45 For example, Chapra noted in his book 
published in 1985 that ribā ‘has the same meaning and import as interest’.46 
The Islamic Research College in the University of al-Azhar stated at its second 
annual conference in 1965 that any interest imposed by banks constituted ribā 
regardless of whether the amount was seen as just or unjust, and regardless of 
41 Ayub, above n 27, 53. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Raquibuz Zaman, ‘Usury (Riba) and the Place of Bank Interest in Islamic Banking and 
Finance’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Banking and Finance 1, 6.  
44 Ibid. 
45 Abdullah Saeed, ‘Islamic Banking and Finance: In Search of a Pragmatic Model’ in Virginia 
Hooker and Amin Saikal (eds), Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium (Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2004) 113, 117. 
46 M Umer Chapra, Towards a Just Monetary System (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1985) as 
quoted in Saeed, ibid 117.  
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the context of the loan.47 Islamic finance theorist, Uzair, also notes that interest, 
in all its forms, is forbidden under Sharīʿa.48 Similarly, the Council of Islamic 
Ideology of Pakistan in the 1980s stated, ‘there is complete unanimity among 
all schools of thought in Islam that the term ribā stands for interest in all its 
types and forms’.49 Furthermore, Maududi (d 1979) states that it is clear from 
his reading of the Qur’an and ḥadīth that ribā includes contemporary interest.50 
However, according to Visser and Visser, ‘[i]f one looks at the literal 
statements, one may be inclined to reject interest totally; people who look at the 
rationale for an injunction may argue that a ban on ribā is justified when 
charging interest brings injustice and not when it does not.’51 This argument 
will now be discussed. 
4 Contextual Interpretation 
Those who understand the ribā verses in the Qur’an and the ḥadīth contextually 
argue that the prohibition against ribā is not directed at profit but a fixed and 
pre-determined return on financial transactions.52 Saeed uses the term 
‘pragmatists’ for those who interpret ribā contextually, and defines them as 
those who try to ‘balance practical realities with traditional Islamic 
principles’.53 Trade and profit are viewed as positive and natural outcomes of a 
healthy market in line with the Qur’anic verse: ‘God has made trade lawful and 
has forbidden ribā.’54 Therefore, many argue that a murābaḥa transaction is a 
form of trade, which is lawful. The additional mark-up price that the buyer has 
to pay is justified as ‘profit’ and compensation because the seller has been 
denied the use of the asset and has provided the good to the buyer before 
payment.55 The mark-up rate is calculated by taking into consideration all direct 
and indirect costs associated with the transaction including the risk of non-
47 Sudin Haron and Wan Nursofiza Wan Azmi, Islamic Finance and Banking System: 
Philosophies, Principles & Practices (McGraw Hill, 2009) 186.  
48 Hans Visser and Herschel Visser, Islamic Finance: Principles and Practice (Edward Elgar, 
2009) 32. 
49 Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), Consolidated Recommendations on the Islamic Economic 
System (Islamabad: Council of Islamic Ideology, 1983) 7, quoted in Saeed, ‘Islamic Banking 
and Finance: In Search of a Pragmatic Model’, above n 45, 118.  
50 Abdullah Saeed, ‘Adapting Understanding of Riba to Islamic Banking: Some Developments’ 
in Mohamed Ariff and Munawar Iqbal (eds), The Foundations of Islamic Banking (Edward 
Elgar, 2011) 54.  
51 Visser and Visser, above n 48, 32.  
52 Vogel and Hayes, above n 6, 203.  
53 Saeed, ‘Adapting Understanding of Riba to Islamic Banking’, above n 50, 55. 
54 The Holy Qur’an, English Translation (Chapter 2, Verse 276) <http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/ 
religious-texts/quran/verses/002-qmt.php>. 
55 Vogel and Hayes, above n 6, 203.  
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payment and the potential profit sacrificed as a result of the deferred payment.56 
Although many early Islamic jurists believed that an increase in the sale price 
could not be justified on the basis of time because time was not considered 
money, contemporary scholars and Islamic institutions have accepted the time 
value of money. This has been the subject of much debate and, as Saeed argues, 
‘[m]urabaha finance and the higher credit price involved therein has clearly 
shown that there is a value of time in murābaḥa based finance, which leads, 
albeit indirectly, to the acceptance of the time value of money. It has been 
conveniently ignored that acceptance the time value of money logically leads 
to the acceptance of interest’.57  
Using the contextual approach, Saeed interprets the verses of the Qur’an and 
ḥadīth according to the context in which they were revealed. For example, he 
criticises the approach of various jurists when interpreting the six-commodity 
ḥadīth mentioned above, which states that goods such as gold and silver can 
only be exchanged with similar goods and in a hand to hand (on the spot) 
transaction.58 Saeed argues that this interpretation neglects the rationale behind 
the ḥadīth, and that the reason these goods are mentioned is that gold and silver 
were the form of money used at the time and the commodities were then 
essential for survival.59 Furthermore, it was common at the time of the Prophet 
for people to trade at one time a larger amount of wheat of inferior quality for 
a lesser amount of wheat of superior quality to be delivered and received in the 
future. This would lead to injustice for poorer people who were paying more 
than they otherwise would for the commodity.60 Thus, Saeed argues that the 
rationale behind the prohibition of the two forms of ribā was  
 ‘potential injustice, to the economically weaker party in a barter 
transaction…’ [such as]…cheating an unsophisticated entrant into the 
market, of any monopsonistic or monopolistic collusion or exploitation 
designed to lower or raise prices beyond what is justified by market 
conditions, and of sales involving uncertainty and speculation.61  
This view is shared by Rida (d 1935) who concluded that the prohibition against 
ribā was revealed at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and does not apply to 
the forms of interest in the modern world.62 Farooq also disagrees with the 
56 Ibid. 
57 Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest, above n 20, 95. 
58 Saeed, ‘The Moral Context of the Prohibition of Riba in Islam Revisited’, above n 29, 508. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid 509–10. 
62 Visser and Visser, above n 48, 21. 
                                                 
2015 TAXATION TREATMENT OF ISLAMIC FINANCE PRODUCTS 273 
orthodox interpretation of ‘ribā’ as ‘interest’.63 His interpretation is that the 
prohibition on ribā is only valid when the increase on the principal loan is not 
noted in the initial contract.64 This would lead to zulm (the Arabic word for 
injustice and exploitation). Thus, if ribā is read according to the broader 
Qur’anic context of charity (sadaqah), it is not interest but increase in money 
(ribā) that leads to zulm and is prohibited.65 Fazlur Rahman also looks at the 
rationale behind the prohibition of ribā and argues that those who interpret ribā 
as being equivalent to modern day interest fail to understand that the Qur’an 
historically banned ribā because it was a form of exploitation at the time of the 
Prophet Muhammad.66 Commenting on the views of Farooq and Rahman, 
Saeed notes that the interpretation that contemporary interest is not ribā is not 
widespread.67 This is because most Islamic scholars and academics still view 
interest as being exploitative in the contemporary economic system.68 
Many commentators such as Saeed, and Vogel and Hayes note that the rise of 
the Islamic finance industry occurred after the independence of Muslim 
countries post-World War II. The end of colonialism and the oil boom through 
the 1970s brought a degree of affluence and independence to Muslim countries 
in the Middle East. Islamic finance products were formulated so that they 
conformed to the modern capitalist economy and were also Sharīʿa-
compliant.69 In order to formulate them in this way, Islamic scholars had to use 
a pragmatic approach and look at the context of the rules of ribā outlined in the 
Qur’an and hadīth. Islamic banking theorists argued that Islamic banking 
should be based on Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) as opposed to interest.70 This 
led to the establishment of the Mit Ghamr Savings Bank in Egypt in the early 
1960s and the creation of a number of Islamic financial institutions around the 
world in the 1970s, such as the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah.71 Among 
the Islamic finance products introduced,72 modern forms of the traditional 
transactions have gained the most popularity but at the same time generated the 
63 Saeed, ‘Adapting Understanding of Riba to Islamic Banking: Some Developments’, above n 
50, 52–3.  
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest, above n 20, 8–15.  
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid 9–10. 
72 Islamic finance products include mudaraba and musharaka (different forms of partnership), 
ijara (leasing), istisnaa (manufacturing) and murābaḥa. See generally Mahmoud Amin el-
Gamal, A Basic Guide to Contemporary Islamic Banking and Finance (Rice University, 2000). 
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most controversy. In Pakistan, murābaḥa totalled 87 per cent of total financing, 
in Dubai Islamic Bank it constituted 82 per cent and in the Islamic Development 
Bank in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, murābaḥa totalled 73 per cent.73 Saeed 
highlights several reasons for the popularity of murābaḥa. First, murābaḥa is a 
short term mechanism in comparison to other PLS products. Second, it allows 
banks to receive a return which is often comparable to the return received by 
interest-based banks with which the Islamic banks are competing; and third, it 
avoids the uncertainty associated with PLS products.74 Saeed’s second reason 
goes to the heart of the issues considered in this article. While murābaḥa 
products may be popular in the modern Islamic finance industry, there is also a 
lot of controversy surrounding them. Murābaḥa will now be discussed in detail.  
IV MURĀBAḤA 
Murābaḥa comes from the Arabic word ‘ribh’ which means gain, profit or 
addition derived from the sale of a commodity on a cost-plus basis, including a 
profit margin.75 The current Islamic banking and finance industry also refers to 
murābaḥa as ‘cost-plus profit financing’ which often involves an Islamic 
finance institution (IFI) selling a commodity to a purchaser at a cost plus a 
mark-up profit rate. Instead of sharing profits and losses, the IFI acts as a 
financial intermediary.76 As will be seen below, certain basic requirements must 
be met before a murābaḥa product is considered Sharīʿa-compliant. These 
include that the buyer has knowledge of the costs and profit margin; that the 
subject of the sale is goods or commodities against money; that the subject of 
the sale is in the possession of the seller; and, that the payment is deferred.77 
Classic Hanafi jurist, Al-Marghinani (d 1197) defines murābaḥa as ‘the sale of 
anything for the price at which it was purchased by the seller and an addition 
of a fixed sum by way of profit’.78 The Maliki and Shafi’i schools of thought 
find murābaḥa sale lawful but have not referenced ḥadīth to back up their legal 
conclusion. This has led critics such as Al-Kaff to argue that murābaḥa was not 
a sale known to the Prophet and his companions and is therefore not Sharīʿa-
compliant.79 On the other hand Maliki mentioned murābaḥa in the Al-
73 Figures from the 1980s: Saeed, ‘Islamic Banking in Practice: A Critical Look at the Murabaha 
Financing Mechanism’, above n 4, 61.  
74 Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest, above n 20, 78.  
75 Ayub, above n 27, 215. 
76 Nabil A Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law (Cambridge, 1986) 94. 
77 Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest, above n 20, 77.  
78 Ayub, above n 27, 216.  
79 Al Kaff, ‘Does Islam Assign Any Value’ (Islamic Research Academy, 1986) cited in Saeed, 
Islamic Banking and Interest, above n 20, 76.  
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Mu’watta — a book on the traditions of the Prophet.80 Examining the practices 
of the people of Medina, Maliki noted that it was known that people who 
purchased cloth in a town would sell it in another town on an agreed profit 
basis.81 Shafi’i also agreed that murābaḥa was a lawful transaction, and 
Marghinani justified murābaḥa on the grounds that it protected customers who 
lacked expertise in trade as there is a mutually agreed upon profit margin.82 
Regardless of the differences of opinion, cost plus profit financing had by the 
1980s become one of the most popular forms of Islamic financing with over 75 
per cent of Islamic finance products being financed through this mode of 
financing.83 As we will see below, certain basic principles must usually be met 
before a murābaḥa product is considered Shariah-compliant. A basic cost plus 
profit murābaḥa sale structure can be explained as follows: 
Figure A  
 
 
80 Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest, above n 20, 78.  
81 Ibid. 
82 Ayub, above n 27, 216. 
83 Saeed, ‘Islamic Banking in Practice: A Critical Look at the Murabaḥah Financing Mechanism’, 
above n 4, 61.  
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As Figure A shows, the following steps need to take place for a murābaḥa 
transaction to be valid. These are: 
1) The customer approaches the bank and requests the purchase of goods. 
2) The customer and the bank sign a contract whereby the bank promises 
to sell and the customer promises to buy the commodity for the agreed 
cost plus profit (in Figure A, corresponding respectively to $100 000 + 
$30 000). The bank appoints an agent or the goods supplier to purchase 
the item. The customer may decide to act as an agent of the bank. If so, 
an agreement of agency is signed between the parties involved in the 
underlying contract, based on a wakalah contract to acquire the asset 
from the supplier. An agency agreement is not needed where the bank 
purchases the commodity directly from the supplier. 
3) The bank purchases the commodity from the goods’ supplier. 
4) The bank pays the goods’ supplier the cost of the commodity (in Figure 
A, $100 000). 
5) If the customer is the agent, he/she takes delivery of the item on behalf 
of the bank as its agent. 
6) The customer offers to purchase the commodity and once the bank 
accepts the offer, the title over the commodity transfers to the customer. 
7) The customer pays the cost plus profit on a deferred basis.84 
Usmani85 notes that it is extremely important for the bank to bear an element of 
risk while the commodity is in its possession. In his opinion, this is one of the 
characteristics that essentially distinguishes murābaḥa from an interest-based 
transaction.86 
Two sale contracts govern the murābaḥa transaction: one between the bank and 
the customer, and one between the bank and the good supplier. 
84 Ayub, above n 27, 225–6. 
85 Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani is a scholar of Islamic finance and a Sharīʿa expert. See Mufti 
Muhammad Taqi Usmani, Profile (2015) Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani 
<http://muftitaqiusmani.com/en/?page_id=11333>. 
86 Ayub, above n 27, 225–6. 
                                                 
2015 TAXATION TREATMENT OF ISLAMIC FINANCE PRODUCTS 277 
In practice, a bank usually appoints an agent (wakil) to acquire the assets/goods 
on the bank’s behalf after the customer has identified the assets.87 The supplier 
of the goods may also act as the bank’s agent and deliver the asset directly to 
the customer. When the customer accepts the offer and agrees to pay the bank 
on a specified date, the agency relationship is lawfully terminated.88 However, 
a murābaḥa transaction through an agency agreement risks being Sharīʿa non-
compliant, as the bank may not have constructive possession of the product 
before the customer receives it. Usmani notes:  
The best way to effect murabahah is that the financier himself purchases the 
commodity directly from the supplier and after taking its delivery sells it to 
the client on murabahah basis. Making the client agent to purchase on behalf 
of the financier renders the arrangement dubious. For this very reason some 
Sharīʿah Boards have forbidden this technique, except in cases where direct 
purchase is not possible at all. Therefore, the agency concept should be 
avoided as far as possible.89 
For a murābaḥa product to be distinguished from an interest-based product, it 
is important that the commodity being sold is in the constructive possession and 
ownership of the bank at the time of the sale.90 Constructive ‘possession’ means 
that the bank has rights, liabilities and risks in respect of the commodity, which 
implies that the bank must have ownership of the commodity.91 It also means 
that the subject of sale must exist at the time of sale. The fact that the bank bears 
the risk of default and delinquency while the goods are in its actual or 
constructive possession is one of the elements that qualifies the murābaḥa 
mode of financing as Sharīʿa-compliant.92  
Sharīʿa compliance is fulfilled by ensuring that the subject of sale is not a 
commodity forbidden under Sharīʿa, the commodity is sold through a valid 
contract, and the price and payment plan known and fixed at the time the 
contract is signed, thereby ensuring that gharar, or uncertainty, is avoided; the 
profit/mark-up is also determined and expressed prior to the purchase and often 
benchmarked according to market interest rates, such as LIBOR;93  the seller 
87 Abradat Kamalpour et al, ‘Murabaha financing’ (Briefing, Ashurst, January 2009) 1–3 
<www.ashurst.com/doc.aspx?id_Content=4298>. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (Kluwer Law International, 
2002) 67. 
90 Mohammed Obaidullah, Islamic Financial Services (King Abdulaziz University Press, 2005) 
72.  
91 Ibid. 
92 Kamalpour et al, above n 87.  
93 Ibid. 
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discloses any defects of the commodity prior to the sale; and, the sale involves 
the full transfer of the legal rights over the commodity.94 
V TAX CONSIDERATIONS 
A Implementation of Murābaḥa in Australia 
Many argue that murābaḥa contracts in Australia are very similar to 
conventional interest-based contracts because both are used to finance 
mortgages. However, while the economic substance of murābaḥa financing is 
similar to a fixed interest loan backed by a mortgage, the form is different 
because murābaḥa financing does not include interest. Taxation of the product 
will depend on whether it is the form or the substance of the murābaḥa 
transaction that is focused on, as will be seen below. Apart from providing a 
Sharīʿa-compliant method of purchasing a house, the murābaḥa form of 
financing is significant because Australia is a net capital importer and tawarruq 
or commodity murābaḥa, known more commonly as ‘interbank finance’, is 
used by Australian financiers to access offshore capital.95 A tawarruq contract 
differs from a murābaḥa contract because the former is used to generate cash 
and is therefore known as a ‘cash finance sale’.96 It consists of a foreign 
financier, a resident investment agency, a resident client (bank or financier), a 
commodity supplier and a commodity buyer. A tawarruq contract involves the 
following transactions:97 
1) The foreign financier signs an agency agreement with an Australian 
investment agency (AIA). The AIA will act as the foreign financier’s 
agent. 
2) The commodity supplier provides the AIA with commodities and 
immediate settlement and payment. 
3) The AIA sells the commodity to the client (bank or financier) at $X 
plus profit mark-up (sale price) on an immediate settlement but 
deferred payment basis. The net result is that while the client owns the 
94 Ibid. 
95 Discussion Paper (2010), above n 1, 32. 
96 Ibid 8.  
97 Ibid. 
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commodity, the client owes money to the foreign financier because the 
AIA acted as an agent for the foreign financier.  
4) The client sells the commodity to the commodity buyer for $X on the 
spot settlement and payment basis. The client has now generated cash. 
5) The client pays the sale price to the AIA at the end of the agreement 
and all the proceeds are distributed to the foreign financier.98 
The taxation implications arising from the implementation of this transaction 
was one matter considered by the Board in its Discussion Paper. 
B The Board’s Discussion Paper 
The Board’s Discussion Paper considers various Islamic finance products 
including the basic cost-plus-profit murābaḥa product and interbank financing 
which are the focus of this article. As shown below, it is clear from the Board’s 
analysis of two case studies and the submissions of various IFIs and related 
groups that mark-up should be treated as interest for taxation law purposes, in 
order for murābaḥa to be treated equally with conventional products. While the 
taxation implications of murābaḥa products will not be analysed here in detail, 
the way in which the Board treats a cost-plus-profit sale similar to a 
conventional fixed interest mortgage — in terms of its structure and the 
deductibility of the profit mark-up — will be briefly summarised.99  
C Cost Plus Profit Sale and a Conventional Fixed 
Interest Mortgage 
1 Structure 
The structure of a basic murābaḥa transaction has been described above. As 
shown, this arrangement may be used to finance the purchase of a property and 
is equivalent to a conventional fixed interest mortgage. The difference is that in 
a conventional mortgage the borrower repays the cost plus interest to the lender 
and the lender has security over the borrower’s property in the event of a 
default. By contrast, an Islamic Financier owns the property outright and the 
borrower repays the cost plus profit on a deferred payment plan. The additional 
98 Ibid. 
99 The Board also treats Islamic interbank finance similarly to a conventional debt instrument. 
Further, it is important to characterise profit mark-up as interest for interest withholding tax 
(IWT) purposes in order to ensure equality. 
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profit mark-up that an Islamic borrower repays is treated as equivalent to the 
interest that a conventional borrower repays and therefore, the net cost is the 
same. It is clear from the Board’s Discussion Paper that an Islamic mortgage 
should be treated according to its economic substance and that from this 
perspective, profit mark-up is equivalent to interest.100 The Board argues, 
therefore, that existing taxation frameworks that apply to a conventional 
mortgage should apply to murābaḥa.101 
2 Deductibility of Profit Mark-Up 
When it comes to deductibility of profit mark-up, the Discussion Paper notes 
that in order for murābaḥa to be treated equally with conventional products, the 
profit mark-up should be deductible.102 This will mean either deducting the 
mark-up under section 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (‘ITAA 
1997’) by characterising mark-up as interest, or doing so under section 25-85 
of the ITAA 1997, under which a return on a debt interest may be deducted. In 
order to fall under this section, the murābaḥa arrangement must be a ‘debt 
interest’ under Division 974 of the ITAA 1997.103  
D Islamic Interbank Finance (IIF) and Conventional 
Debt Instrument (CDI) 
The structure of Islamic interbank finance is described above. The Board is 
consistent in its view that the economic substance of these arrangements should 
be analysed, as opposed to their form.104 The Board argues that for taxation 
purposes the economic substance of an IIF should be equivalent to a 
conventional debt instrument issued by a resident Client.105 Further, the sale 
price of an IIF arrangement should be treated as equivalent to the face value of 
the CDI, and the profit mark-up in an IIF should be equivalent to a return on 
the CDI. 
If the substance-based approach is taken, the return on the CDI will be treated 
as interest under interest withholding tax provisions for non-resident 
financiers.106 Therefore, the profit mark-up under IIF will also be treated as 
100 Discussion Paper (2010), above n 1, 27–9. 
101 Ibid 30–1. 
102 Ibid 29–30. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid 34. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid 34–5. 
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interest for IWT purposes because of the expanded definition of interest under 
section 128A (1AB) of the ITAA 1936: 
interest includes an amount, other than an amount referred to in subsection 
26C(1): 
(a) that is in the nature of interest; or 
(b) to the extent that it could reasonably be regarded as having been converted 
into a form that is in substitution for interest. 
Arguably, the ‘profit mark-up’ is akin to the nature of interest because, if one 
views the economic substance of murābaḥa, the profit mark-up is the increased 
price that one pays because of delayed payments.107 Commenting on section 
128(1AB), Buchanan states, ‘as far as I’m aware (not being a Sharīʿa scholar) 
this interpretation would not, of itself, cause the mark-up to be considered 
ribā.’108 However, his comment on treating mark-up as interest under s 25-85 
and s 128(1AB) ITAA 1936 provides no reason why mark-up will not be 
considered ribā for Muslims, and the subject is obviously controversial despite 
Buchanan’s claim. The impact for Muslims of treating mark-up as if it were 
interest will be discussed in detail below. 
E IWT Exemption 
One of the points highlighted in the submissions following the Discussion 
Paper is that the Double Taxation Agreement (DTA) under the International 
Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth) (ITAA 1953) may allow withholding tax to be 
eliminated if the interest is paid to an unrelated financial institution overseas.109  
The major issue in the case of IIF, however, is that Australia does not have 
DTAs with many Islamic countries. This means that the profit mark-up may be 
taxed even where the non-resident does not have a permanent establishment in 
Australia.110 If an IWT exemption is not applied, the resident agent will 
withhold IWT from the interest it receives because the non-resident financier 
107 Richard Buchanan, ‘Islamic Finance: The Path to Tax Neutrality’ (Paper presented at the 
Financial Services Taxation Conference, Sanctuary Cove, Queensland, 11–12 February 2010) 
11. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid 12; Blake Dawson, Submission to the Australian Government, Board of Taxation, Review 
of the Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance (2010) 17 December 2010, 5–6; MCCA Limited, 
Submission to the Australian Government, Board of Taxation, Review of the Taxation 
Treatment of Islamic Finance (2010) 3. 
110 Buchanan, above n 107, 11. 
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will eventually become entitled to receive the interest under Section 12-250 in 
Schedule 1 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth).111 
If the profit mark-up is not treated as interest, the mark-up may be treated as an 
‘income gain’, which results in unequal tax treatment. If the client is a non-
resident of Australia and a resident of a country with which Australia does not 
have a DTA, the next question to determine will be whether the gain or profit 
took place in Australia.112 If it did take place in Australia, that is, if Australia 
was where the contract was signed and the purchase entered into, then the gain 
would be subject to Australian tax at a rate applicable to a non-resident client; 
for a corporation this is 30 per cent.113 Norman and Challoner note that this 
would ‘be an unfavourable outcome as compared to the margin in a commodity 
murabahah being treated as “interest”’.114  
F Taxation of Financial Arrangements (TOFA) Tax 
Timing Rules 
The Taxation of Financial Arrangements tax-timing rules115 were introduced as 
a reform to the previous taxation system where a ‘form over substance’ 
approach was used to classify financial arrangements. The explanatory 
memorandum to the Tax Laws Amendment (Taxation of Financial 
Arrangements) Act 2008 (Cth) notes that the previous form over substance 
approach: ‘has resulted in inconsistencies in the tax treatment of transactions 
with similar economic substance which has impeded commercial decision-
making, created difficulties in addressing financial innovation, and facilitated 
tax deferral and tax arbitrage’.116 It is for this reason that TOFA tax-timing rules 
do not refer to ‘interest’ but to ‘gains and losses’.  
For the resident financier, interest under a conventional mortgage is viewed as 
a gain from a financial arrangement using the accruals method. A similar 
treatment of ‘profit mark-up’ is proposed by the Board in order to ensure equal 
treatment between murābaḥa and a conventional fixed interest mortgage.117 
Treating ‘interest’ under a conventional fixed interest mortgage and the ‘profit 
111 Ibid. 
112 Peter Norman and John Challoner, ‘Shariah Compliant Financing in Australia’ (2010) 13(4) 
The Tax Specialist 186, 191. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Tax-timing is the term used when income is recognised and expenses are deductible for tax 
purposes.  
116 Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Taxation of Financial Arrangements) Bill 
2008. 
117 Discussion Paper (2010), above n 1, 15–17. 
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mark-up’ under murābaḥa equally is in line with the TOFA practice of taking 
a substantive rather than a form based approach to financial arrangements. The 
obvious conclusion that one reaches is that, in substance, a murābaḥa home 
loan is no different to a conventional fixed interest mortgage. 
This brief summary shows how profit mark-up is treated as interest for taxation 
purposes in Australia. The next section will analyse the present discourse on 
the treatment of murābaḥa. 
VI PRESENT DISCOURSE ON THE TREATMENT OF 
MURĀBAḤA 
A Implications of Treating Mark-Up as Interest — 
Different Perspectives 
As mentioned, the Board proposes that mark-up be treated as interest for 
taxation purposes in order to ensure that Islamic finance products are treated 
equally with conventional products. Two matters in particular arise out of the 
treatment of mark-up as interest: whether murābaḥa will be viewed as Sharīʿa-
compliant when mark-up is treated as if it were interest, and, if not, whether 
this could cause Australia to become less attractive for international investors. 
These two questions will be addressed by a consideration of the implications of 
treating mark-up as interest from the perspectives of Australian financial 
institutions and related bodies on the one hand and United Kingdom bodies on 
the other.  
B Australian Financial Institutions (AFIs) and Related 
Groups  
As shown above, the Board discusses treating mark up as interest for tax 
purposes. The Board does not view this as being problematic. It may be argued, 
however, that the Australian financial institutions and related groups 
responding to the Discussion Paper are not Islamic institutions and strict 
Sharīʿa compliance is not a significant issue for them. However, Sharīʿa 
compliance should be an issue for AFIs and related groups to the extent that 
their international portfolio and the authenticity of the Sharīʿa-compliant 
products being offered can be affected.  
Furthermore, unlike the United Kingdom, Australia does not have an Islamic 
bank but rather co-operatives such as the Muslim Community Cooperative 
Australia Ltd (MCCA). The MCCA submission indicates agreement with the 
method proposed by the Board, but expresses worry about the impact that the 
term ‘interest’ may have on the community. The MCCA justifies its submission 
284 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 20 NO 2 
by arguing that the returns in a murābaḥa product, are not ‘interest’ in the 
ordinary sense of the term.118 However, the MCCA submissions does not define 
‘interest’ clearly. One can conclude that, while the MCCA is concerned about 
the impact that the taxation of murābaḥa will have on the community, it is not 
opposed to the taxation process but rather wants to change the ‘name’ as 
opposed to the ‘form’ of the taxation terminology used. The MCCA submission 
also expresses agreement that, ‘[t]o create a level playing field for Islamic 
finance, business costs, even though they are called profits, should be 
accommodated under the general deductibility of section 8-1 of the ITAA 
1997.’119 Therefore, the MCCA seems to be supporting the treatment of profit 
mark-up as interest, despite its proposition that the term ‘interest’ should not be 
used.  
One can also argue that it takes a contextual approach to the definition of ribā 
and does not characterise interest in the murābaḥa product as ribā. For the 
MCCA, profit mark-up and returns on Islamic products are Sharīʿa-compliant. 
This is made clear in paragraph 12 of the MCCA’s submission: 
For Islamic finance products based on cost plus profit sales and other 
methods, the word ‘interest’ should not be used in the legislation. Rather the 
terms like profit, rent or fee, as appropriate, should be used to identify 
relevant returns. Returns paid for Shariah compliant products are generally 
derived on the basis of trading profits, rental payments or management fees. 
By definition, these returns are not interest in an ordinary sense of the term. 
Hence, we propose to identify them as they are derived as profits, rentals or 
fees. This will avoid any potential controversies in relation to the Shariah 
concept of finance.120 
The Board does not discuss in detail the fact that the word ‘interest’ is used in 
the legislation. Rather, it focuses on the substance of the product and treating 
Islamic finance products equally to conventional products. This approach is 
followed by a law firm, Blake Dawson, which notes in its submission  
that based on the case law, the better view is that the profit component could 
be regarded as interest for the purposes of the IWT provisions. However, in 
the context of Shariah-compliant products such as the BBA121, there will be 
a number of contractual arrangements between the Client and the non-
resident financier to reflect the different legal relationships required to ensure 
118 MCCA Limited, above n 109, 4.  
119 Ibid 1.  
120 Ibid 4. 
121 BBA or Al-Bai' Bithaman Ajil is a term typically used in Malaysia and an alternative name 
for murābaḥa. 
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that the profit component derived by the non-resident financier is not 
considered riba. Any conditionality between the contractual arrangements 
could together create uncertainty as to whether the profit component does in 
fact satisfy the definition of interest in section 128A(1AB). However, if the 
definition of interest was amended to explicitly include the profit component, 
this should provide sufficient certainty.122 
Blake Dawson does not discuss the problem of interest from a social 
perspective, but from a legal standpoint. Again, agreeing with the Board, the 
Blake Dawson submission notes that it is important for the profit component to 
be treated as interest for the purposes of tax. In the future, the Board will need 
to address Blake Dawson’s proposal that in order ensure certainty, the profit 
component must fit the definition of interest. 
Ernst & Young take a similar position to Blake Dawson submitting that profit 
be treated as interest for taxation purposes, but further submit that amending 
the legislation would be complex and costly and would add to the already huge 
volume of taxation law in Australia. Instead, Ernst & Young propose an 
approach that allows the current legislation to govern Islamic finance products 
by treating murābaḥa as equivalent to an interest-bearing loan.123 
The submission of the international law firm Norton Rose, proposed that 
legislative amendments be made, but recommended that the amendments not 
be couched in religious terms so that they are not seen as discriminatory and 
favouring a particular religion. Freudenberg and Nathie from Griffith 
University discuss the constitutional implications of introducing faith-based 
legislation in detail in their submission.124 They note the tension between 
section 116 of the Australian Constitution providing for religious freedom, and 
section 51, which provides the Commonwealth with the power to tax. 
Freudenberg and Nathie refer to the case of Halliday v The Commonwealth of 
Australia125 and the Fairfax decision126 to argue that taxation power is broad 
enough to cater for Islamic finance without resulting in discrimination or being 
in conflict with secular taxation law.127 
122 Blake Dawson, above n 109, 3.   
123 Ernst & Young, Submission to the Australian Government, Board of Taxation, Review of the 
Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance (2010) 17 December 2010, 2–3. 
124 For a more detailed discussion see: Dr Brett Freudenberg and Dr Mahmood Nathie, 
Submission to the Australian Government, Board of Taxation, Review of the Taxation 
Treatment of Islamic Finance (2010) 17 December 2010.   
125 [2000] FCA 950. 
126 Fairfax v FC of T (1965) 114 CLR 1. 
127 Freudenberg and Nathie, above n 124, 10–15. 
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However, Norton Rose proposes the approach taken by the United Kingdom 
government:  
For example, section 47 of the UK’s Finance Act 2005 was introduced to 
address tax issues associated with commodity Murabaha transactions ...The 
approach of this provision in the UK legislation is to describe, in fairly simple 
terms, the elements of the transaction, to look at whether the difference 
between the sale price and the purchase price equates, in substance, to the 
return on an investment of money at interest and to then treat that margin as 
the ‘alternative finance return’. The ‘alternative finance return’ is then treated 
as interest for all United Kingdom tax purposes.128 
From the perspective of the MCCA, this approach would have a less 
controversial impact on the community than the idea posited by the Australian 
Board of Taxation, and from the perspective of Norton Rose it would be a 
simple approach that looks at the economic substance of the product as opposed 
to its form, and allows Western and Islamic products to be treated equally for 
taxation purposes. This approach, however, assumes that simply changing the 
term ‘interest’ will appease the Muslim community.  
A quick fix response of changing the terminology to ‘alternative finance 
return’, or, as proposed by the MCCA, ‘financier withholding tax’ as opposed 
to the term ‘interest withholding tax’, does not deal with the issue of whether 
the profit or return being discussed may be viewed as interest under Sharīʿa 
regardless of how it is treated under Australian law. The submissions seem to 
be based on the assumption that the profit mark-up in the murābaḥa product is 
allowed under Sharīʿa and is not of a controversial nature. For example, in the 
Taxation Institute and Australian Financial Markets Association joint 
submission, the discussion of IWT simply notes that the profit component in a 
tawarruq transaction should fall under the definition of interest under section 
128(1AB) of the ITAA 1936.129  
Two submissions deal with the impact of Islamic finance products on 
Australian society. The first submission is by David Clark, a member of the 
NSW Legislative Council representing the Liberal Party of Australia, and a 
strong advocate of ‘Christian values’.130 The other is by Vickie Janson, the vice-
128 Norton Rose Australia, Submission to the Australian Government, Board of Taxation, Review 
of the Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance (2010) 17 December 2010, 14–15.   
129 The Taxation Institute of Australia and Australian Financial Markets Association, Submission 
to the Australian Government, Board of Taxation, Review of the Taxation Treatment of Islamic 
Finance (2010) 18 January 2011, 18–20. 
130 ABC Radio National, ‘David Clark’, Sunday Profile, 18 September 2005 (Monica Attard and 
David Clark) <http://www.abc.net.au/sundayprofile/stories/s1461663.htm>. 
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president of Q Society, a group that opposes what it claims to be the 
‘Islamisation’ of Australia.131 Clark notes in his submission: 
the Board should not be relying on the ‘Islamic economic system’ as a basis 
of the review. This is not the system that the Islamic finance operates in and 
is partly why Islamic financial products must replicate conventional products. 
As Islamic finance operates in a conventional system and Islamic finance 
principles adapt to accommodate this system, in substance Islamic finance 
principles are conventional principles. Thus, the assumption that Islamic 
finance products are based on Islamic finance principles, operating in an 
Islamic economic system has no worth in a practical exercise to determine 
the appropriate tax treatment of Islamic finance products.132 
This comment is flawed in that, as shown above, the Board does not rely on the 
Islamic economic system as a basis of its review. It is interesting to note, 
nonetheless, that Clark’s submission, unlike the other submissions, addresses 
the issue of Islamic finance principles being very similar to conventional 
principles. However, he discusses this in the context of pointing out inherent 
problems with Islamic finance products and, in sum, of asserting that the 
Islamic finance industry will ‘jeopardise the integrity of the Australian financial 
services industry’.133 Janson takes a similar but more confronting approach to 
the Discussion Paper:  
I would strongly recommend that the government reassess this commitment 
to sharia finance with its connections to Islamic groups, it’s [sic] theological 
foundations and it’s [sic] undermining of both western values and economy... 
It appears support for sharia finance is support for Islamic ideologies rather 
than the moderates who utilise conventional banking.134  
Janson also claims that the leaders in the Islamic finance industry, such as 
Usmani, have jihadist views.135 She is more concerned about the impact that 
Sharīʿa products will have on ‘Australian values’136 than with the provision of 
space for Islamic finance products in Australia. Although this view is not shared 
131 Q Society of Australia Inc, Why We Oppose Islam (2013) <http://www.qsociety.org.au/ 
opposing_islam.htm>. 
132 David Clark, Submission to the Australian Government, Board of Taxation, Review of the 
Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance (2010) 15 December 2010, 2 [3.1(d)]. 
133 Ibid 6 [7.1]. 
134 Vickie Janson, Submission to the Australian Government, Board of Taxation, Review of the 
Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance (2010) 30 November 2010, 5.  
135 Ibid 1. 
136 The concept of ‘Australian values’ is not discussed in detail in this article. More information 
on Vickie Janson’s concept of how ‘Islamic values’ are incompatible with ‘Australian values’ 
can be found in her book Vickie Janson, Ideological Jihad (Castle Publishing Services, 2009).  
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by other AFIs, law firms and/or financial institutions, it is a view held by a 
number of Australians who pit Islamic values against Western values and fear 
the influence of the former. For example, Liberal Party Senator Bernardi shares 
Clark’s and Janson’s views, and is opposed to the introduction of Sharīʿa 
banking in Australia because, in his view, Islamic law is incompatible with 
Australia’s ‘western values’.137 In an interview with the ABC, Senator Bernardi 
said:  
Sharia finance is one aspect of Sharia or Islamic law and I reject it entirely. 
We shouldn’t be changing our legal system or our legal framework to 
accommodate a system of laws that is wholly incompatible with Western 
values… And Sharia is not just about commercial transactions, it indulges an 
aspect of every part of people’s lives … so it’s like a ball of string that once 
you start tugging at it, the entire ball becomes unravelled and that’s something 
I don’t want to see happen in this country.138 
In an attempt to counter such views, the Malaysian law firm, Zaid Ibrahim & 
Co, which has recently set up offices in Sydney and Melbourne, released a 
publication titled ‘Demystifying Islamic Finance’, in which it identifies what it 
sees as the 15 most frequent misconceptions about Islamic finance in the 
western world.139 Clark’s argument that Islamic finance products are very 
similar to conventional products is addressed under ‘Misconception 3’ — 
‘Replica of Conventional Finance’. Zaid Ibrahim & Co note: ‘… the fact 
remains that Islamic finance are [sic] governed by some fundamental principles 
that are contrary to conventional finance, such as prohibitions against riba 
(usury/interest), maisir (betting/gambling) and gharar (dubious ambiguity).’140 
Furthermore, under ‘Misconception 15’: ‘To replace conventional system, 
aimed towards Islam’s world domination’, the publication addresses the 
argument of Janson and Senator Bernardi that Islamic finance is undermining 
the theological underpinnings of Australian society. Under this heading the firm 
notes: ‘How would this be possible when the whole Islamic finance system 
137 AAP, ‘Liberal Senator Cory Bernardi’s Bid to Curb Sharia Banking Dealt Blow by Colleague 
George Brandis’, The Australian (online), 2 November 2010 <http://www.the 
australian.com.au/national-affairs/politics-news/liberal-senator-cory-bernardis-bid-to-curb-
sharia-banking-dealt-blow-by-colleague-george-brandis/story-fn59nqld-1225946697055>.  
138 ABC National Radio, ‘Liberal Senator Wants to Stop Sharia Banking Expansion’, AM, 2 
November 2010 (Tony Eastley and Cory Bernardi) <http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/ 
2010/s3054541.htm>. 
139 Zaid Ibrahim & Co, ‘Demystifying Islamic Finance: Correcting Misconceptions, Advancing 
Value Propositions’ (Booklet, Zaid Ibrahim & Co) <http://wasil.org.pk/Knowledge-Center/ 
Demystifying-Islamic-Finance-soft-copy.pdf>. 
140 Ibid 9. 
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accounts for less than 1% of the global financial system, and Muslim nations 
remain largely the poorest and under-developed?’141 
Crescent Investments Australasia (CIA) also take a very different approach to 
Janson and Clark.142 Crescent Investment’s submission claims that there are 
murābaḥa products that are Sharīʿa-compliant and agrees with the way in 
which the Board proposes to tax the products. CIA also notes that it will not 
deal in debt-based products but believes that the tax implications have been 
covered adequately.143 
Similarly, Freudenberg and Nathie from Griffith University agree that the way 
in which the Board proposes to tax murābaḥa will ensure equality of treatment 
between conventional and Islamic finance products, and encourage alternative 
forms of financing.144 However, they do note that the introduction of Islamic 
finance both in Australia and the UK is ‘based on “access to good financial 
services” and not religion’.145 This is an important point because, in contrast to 
the views of Clark and Janson, the issue for AFIs and related bodies is not 
religion, but economic development. On this view, Australia benefits from the 
introduction of Islamic finance products to its financial system as this opens 
doors to greater investment of capital from overseas and this in turn paves the 
way for greater economic prosperity and development. 
None of the submissions to the Discussion Paper have discussed in detail the 
religious controversies involved in treating mark-up as interest. As mentioned, 
if anything, the taxation treatment of mark-up is simply assumed to be Sharīʿa-
compliant. Islamic banking in Australia is only in its infancy. Apart from the 
submissions discussed above and available for public view, no public 
submissions by Sharīʿa scholars or members of the Muslim community in 
Australia appear on the Board’s website. One can only assume that the 
Australian Muslim community either accepts the Board’s view of how Sharīʿa-
compliant products should be taxed, or that Islamic finance is not developed 
enough in Australia to spur debate. This is in contrast to the position in the UK, 
where Islamic finance has spurred extensive debate. 
141 Ibid 22. 
142 Crescent Investments Australasia, Submission to the Australian Government, Board of 
Taxation, Review of the Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance (2010).  
143 Ibid. 
144 Freudenberg and Nathie, above n 124, 2. 
145 Ibid 15. 
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C Financial Institutions in the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom has paved the way for other Western countries to develop 
and support Islamic finance. The statistics highlighted in a publication by 
TheCityUK in 2013 noted that the United Kingdom had a total of US$19 billion 
in Sharīʿa-compliant financial assets.146 The assets were largely held by HSBC 
Amanah, which is the Islamic financial services division of the HSBC Group 
that provides Islamic financial services across various countries. According to 
this publication, not only did the UK financial system contain the most Islamic 
financial assets in the West; it was placed ninth globally and ahead of major 
Muslim-majority countries such as Pakistan, Turkey and Indonesia.147 This 
may be because the UK has a large Muslim population of approximately 2.9 
million.148  
With the support of the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) in the UK, several legislative amendments149 were introduced in 2003 to 
achieve similar objectives to those that the Board proposes for Australia in its 
Discussion Paper. The reaction by UK financial institutions and related bodies 
was very similar to that of Australian bodies, the only difference being that 
there was more debate and reaction from the UK Muslim community, as 
discussed further below. 
As noted in the Financial Services Authority (FSA) publication on Islamic 
Finance in the UK, the UK has been involved in the Islamic finance industry 
for 30 years and international institutions such as Citi, Deutsche and HSBC 
have been established in the Middle East and South East Asia.150 This has meant 
that these banks have gained knowledge of the economic system in the region, 
including Islamic banking practices. For this reason, the banks have been quick 
146 Marko Maslakovic, ‘UK the Leading Western Centre for Islamic Finance’ (Report, 
Financial Markets Series, TheCityUK, October 2013) 3 <http://www.thecityuk.com/research/ 
our-work/reports-list/islamic-finance-2013>. 
147 Ibid 5. 
148 Pew Research Centre, 5 Facts about the Muslim population in Europe (17 November 2015) 
<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-
europe/>. 
149 The legislative amendments in the UK consisted of reforming the income tax rules to 
accommodate alternative finance arrangements; reforming the stamp duty land tax to remove 
double taxation; explaining how to determine ‘finance cost’ and, in 2007, introducing 
legislative reforms to facilitate the issue of sukuk or Islamic bonds to ensure that the same tax 
treatment would apply. See Discussion Paper (2010), above n 1, 467. 
150 Michael Ainley et al, ‘Islamic Finance in the UK: Regulation and Challenges’ (Financial 
Services Authority, Discussion Paper, November 2007) 7 <http://media4.efinancialnews.com/ 
share/media/downloads/2007/11/2349281881.pdf>. 
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to offer Islamic products internationally and locally in London.151 This has 
benefited both international financial institutions and UK-based institutions. 
For example, in 2007 Kuwait’s largest holding company, Investment Dar and 
Adeem Investment Co bought a stake in Aston Martin. Adeem is an investment 
and asset management company that only invests in Sharīʿa-compliant 
products. Sharia-complaint financing was used in the purchase of Aston 
Martin.152 In a speech in September 1995, Lord Edward George, Governor of 
the Bank of England, noted the ‘growing importance of Islamic banking in the 
Muslim world and its emergence on the international stage as well as the need 
to put Islamic banking in the context of London’s tradition of competitive 
innovation.’ 153 In September 2003, Sir Howard Davies, then Chairman of the 
FSA, gave a speech in Bahrain saying that the UK had ‘a clear economic 
interest in trying to ensure that the conditions for a flourishing Islamic market 
are in place in London’ and that it would be ‘good for Muslim consumers, good 
for innovations and diversity in our markets and good for London as an 
international financial centre’.154 Thus, discussion on Islamic finance products 
has existed in the UK since the 1990s and legislative amendments were made 
in 2003 and 2007,155 whereas Islamic finance products have only very recently 
emerged in Australia and legislative changes are yet to be made. 
Islamic finance has been so welcomed by financial institutions in the UK that 
it has resulted in the following: 
• The UK is currently the leading Western country for Islamic finance 
with US$19 billion of reported assets; 
• More than 20 banks with Sharīʿa windows, six of which are fully 
Sharīʿa compliant; 
• 25 law firms with expertise in Islamic finance;  
• Advisory services on Islamic finance in the four major professional 
services firms and ten universities and business schools in the UK;  
• The UK issued Sukuk (Islamic bond) valued at £200 million, maturing 
on 22 July 2019 and sold to investors in the UK and globally. The 
151 Ibid. 
152 Sohail Jaffer (ed), Islamic Investment Banking: Emerging Trends, Developments and 
Opportunities (Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC, 2010) 358. 
153 Ainley et al, above n 150, 8. 
154 Ibid 9. 
155 See Discussion Paper (2010), above n 1, 63–4.  
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London Stock Exchange has raised over US$34 billion through issuing 
49 Islamic bonds;  
• educational institutes offering training and courses on Islamic 
finance.156 
Unlike the Austrade publication or the Board’s discussion paper, the FSA 
publication discusses Sharīʿa-compliant issues arising from the introduction of 
Islamic finance products. It notes that, while certain Sharīʿa scholars may 
approve some Islamic finance products as Sharīʿa compliant, others may not. 
As in Australia, this does raise challenges since most financial institutions are 
in no position to assess which scholarly opinion is the correct one. Instead they 
tend to follow Sharīʿa standards as outlined by the Sharīʿa supervisory boards 
set up by the institutions themselves. The FSA publication notes that, ‘[i]t is 
widely acknowledged that there is a global shortage of experienced 
professionals in the Islamic finance sector … the shortage of resources also 
extends to Sharia scholars who have relevant banking experience’. 157  
The fact that there is a shortage of experienced Sharīʿa scholars and 
professionals in Islamic finance means there is a possibility that the general 
public and Sharīʿa scholars with no in-depth knowledge of Islamic products 
can either introduce a regime of Islamic law that is non-compliant with Sharīʿa, 
or reject the current Islamic finance products on the market as being non-
Sharīʿa-compliant and thus cause confusion and uncertainty. This uncertainty 
also exists in the UK as evidenced by the fact that the profit mark-up is treated 
as interest in murābaḥa products for taxation purposes and many murābaḥa 
transactions that take place are not Sharīʿa-compliant.  
This uncertainty was reflected in the 2002 case of Islamic Investment Company 
of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd v Symphony Gems NV (‘Symphony Gems’).158 The 
judgment in this case was the first instance of a Western court of law — in this 
case the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division Commercial Court of 
the United Kingdom — ruling on the applicability of a murābaḥa contract. In 
this case, the Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd (‘IICG’) 
entered into a murābaḥa contract with Symphony Gems NV (‘Symphony’). 
Symphony identified precious gems and stones that IICG would purchase and 
resell to Symphony on a cost plus mark-up basis. The murābaḥa contract noted 
156 ‘UK Excellence in Islamic Finance’ (UK Trade and Investment, October 2014) 3 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/367154/UKTI
_UK_Excellence_in_Islamic_Finance_Reprint_2014_Spread.pdf>. 
157 Ainley et al, above n 150. 
158 [2002] All ER (D) 171 (13 February 2002) (‘Symphony Gems’). 
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another purchase contract whereby the IICG would purchase the gems from a 
supplier, known as Precious and sell them to Symphony. IICG instituted 
proceedings against Symphony when Symphony did not repay IICG in full, 
seeking to reclaim the outstanding balance from Symphony. Symphony made 
several arguments in its defence, but this article will focus on the argument by 
Symphony that the murābaḥa contract was not Sharīʿa-compliant, and that the 
IICG charter demanded compliance with Islamic law. In fact, the murābaḥa 
contract was not compliant with Sharīʿa because it ignored the essential 
requirement that IICG, as the seller, had to own or possess the goods that were 
for sale.159 This is explained below, by the diagrams comparing a Sharīʿa-
compliant murābaḥa contract (Figure B) with the case of Symphony Gems 
consisting of a non Sharīʿa-complaint murābaḥa contract (Figure C): 
Figure B 
 
 
 
159 Umar F Moghul and Arshad A Ahmed, ‘Contractual Forms in Islamic Finance Law and 
Islamic Inv Co of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd v Symphony Gems NV & Ors: A First Impression 
of Islamic Finance’ (2003) 27 Fordham International Law Journal 150, 156. 
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Figure C 
 
 
As shown in Figure B, the risk of ownership of the goods is what constitutes a 
murābaḥa transaction as Sharīʿa-compliant. By comparison, Figure C shows 
that in the case of Symphony Gems, the IICG used the supplier, Precious, to 
send the goods directly to Symphony and therefore the gems were never in 
IICG’s ‘constructive possession’ which is essentially ownership as discussed 
above under the definition of murābaḥa. Symphony also did not have the right 
to reject the gems if it found that the gems were defective in any way.160 Moghul 
and Ahmed argue:  
Though it is possible that Symphony waived its Islamic legal rights and chose 
to bear these responsibilities itself, it seems more likely, given the 
circumstances of this case and the superior bargaining posture inherent to 
commercial banks, that IICG sought to mimic conventional interest-bearing 
financing to the greatest extent possible by imposing these provisions upon 
its customer Symphony.161  
160 Ibid 187. 
161 Ibid 189. 
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After consulting the Sharīʿa expert Dr Yahya al-Samaan as an expert witness, 
Tomlinson J stated:  
it is absolutely critical to note … that the contract with which I am concerned 
is governed not by Shariah law but by English law. Indeed, it is equally 
critical to note that Dr. Samaan, after examining the nature and terms of the 
contract ... comes to this conclusion ... that the Agreement in issue does not 
have the essential characteristics of a [m]urabaha contract.162 
Tomlinson J therefore noted that, while the murābaḥa contract was not 
compliant with Sharīʿa-law, he was bound to assess the case according to 
English law and not Islamic law. This case provides an example of how a 
murābaḥa contract which is not compliant with Sharīʿa may still be enforced 
in Western jurisdictions if English law applies.  
VII IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL DEBATE IN AUSTRALIA 
Islamic finance is still a novel idea in Australia. According to the 2011 
Australian Bureau of Statistics census, approximately 476 291 people in 
Australia are Muslims or 2.2 per cent of the population.163 By comparison, 
Islam is the second largest religion in the UK where the Muslim population is 
approximately 2.9 million or 4.8 per cent of the total population.164 Ahmad, 
Osmani and Karim note the following: 
Skepticism about Sharīʿah compliant financing and investment products may 
be a further barrier to the growth of Islamic finance. While Islamic financial 
services in Australia have been used by members of the Muslim community, 
and while demand for such services exceeds the supply, not everyone 
welcomes the growth of Islamic finance. Within Australia’s Muslim 
community there are those who are skeptical about (and in some cases 
downright hostile to) the first Islamic finance products available to Australian 
Muslims, questioning the validity of the Sharīʿah-compliant label.165  
162 Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd v Symphony Gems NV and others 
[2002] All ER (D) 171 (13 February, 2002) 6. 
163 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Cultural Diversity in Australia Reflecting a Nation: Stories 
from the 2011 Consensus (21 June 2012) <http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/ 
Lookup/2071.0main+features902012-2013>. 
164 Pew Research Centre, above n 148. 
165 Abu Umar Faruq Ahmad, Noor Mohammad Osmani and Mohd Fazlul Karim, ‘Islamic 
Finance in Australia: The Potential Problems and Prospects’ (Paper presented at Seventh 
International Conference, The Tawhidi Epistemology: Zakat and Waqf Economy, Malaysia, 6–
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However, Ahmad, Osmani and Karim provide no ‘direct’ or ‘empirical’ 
evidence to support their contention regarding the scepticism existing in 
the Australian Muslim community about Islamic finance products. The 
only support they provide regarding Muslims’ attitudes to the financial 
products they are being offered is the view of another academic, Ariff, 
whom they quote as saying:  
‘Many would say that the Islamic banks are not really different from 
conventional banks and that they are playing with words and semantics 
and so on and so forth — coming up with Arabic terms that sound very 
Islamic but if you scratch it, you will find that it’s not that different from 
conventional financial products. So such concerns do exist.’166 
By contrast, according to the research conducted by Rammal and Zurbruegg 
only 55.7 per cent of the people surveyed were, in 2007, aware of Islamic 
banking products in Australia, due to the lack of Islamic finance products 
offered in Australia and 92.5 per cent said they were keen to switch from 
conventional to Islamic finance banking products.167 
It is also clear from the Board’s discussion paper that the Australian 
government and relevant financial institutions are very interested in introducing 
Islamic finance products to Australia. Although the Australian Muslim 
population is much smaller than the UK Muslim population, the focus of certain 
politicians has largely been on providing opportunities for foreign investors to 
invest in Sharīʿa-compliant products.168 This objective is noted in the Austrade 
publication titled Islamic Finance (2010) when it refers to attracting investment 
in Australian assets and businesses from overseas Shariah investors.169 
7 January 2010) 219, 225 <http://www.ukm.my/hadhari/publication/proceedings-of-seventh-
international-conference-the-tawhidi-epistemology-zakat-and-waqf-economy/>. 
166 Ibid 225. 
167 Hussain Gulzar Rammal and Ralf Zurbruegg, ‘Awareness of Islamic Banking Products among 
Muslims: The Case of Australia’ (2007) 12(1) Journal of Financial Services Marketing 65, 70–
2. 
168 It is important to note that support is provided by certain politicians, such as Assistant 
Treasurer Nick Sherry and Minister Chris Bowen. Islamic finance has not been adopted as the 
policy of any political party. Furthermore, there have been no further reports discussing Islamic 
Finance since 2010 which may indicate that support for Islamic Finance has declined. See also 
Corrs Chambers Westgarth, ‘Islamic Finance in Australia Part 3 — What’s Stopping Islamic 
Finance Flourishing Down Under and What Must be Done” (2012) <http://www.corrs. 
com.au/thinking/insights/islamic-finance-in-australia-part-3-whats-stopping-islamic-finance-
flourishing-down-under-and-what-must-be-done/>. 
169 Australian Government, Austrade, Islamic Finance (2010) 6 <https://www.google.com.au/ 
search?q=Islamic+Finance+(2010):+%E2%80%98Attracting+Investment+iIn+Australian+As
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Although another objective of Austrade is to provide Australian Muslims with 
Sharīʿa-compliant products, it is clear that the Australian government will 
profit more from attracting international investment than from providing 
services to Australian Muslims. This is the reason why the then Assistant 
Treasurer, Nick Sherry, and the then Minister of Financial Services, 
Superannuation and Corporate Law (9 June 2009–14 September 2010), Chris 
Bowen, announced in April 2010 that the Board was to undertake a review of 
Australian tax law in order to ensure that the expansion of Islamic finance is 
not inhibited.170 Furthermore, it is clear from the international discussion of 
treating mark-up as interest that there has been much debate in Muslim and 
non-Muslim countries about whether the murābaḥa product is Sharīʿa-
compliant. Therefore, there is a strong possibility that this debate will also occur 
in Australia as Islamic finance becomes more established and the Australian 
Muslim population grows. To date, we have not seen much evidence of the 
existence of such debate among Australian Muslims. In fact, the views of 
Janson, Clark and Bernardi show that some Australians, perhaps a minority, are 
still considering whether Sharīʿa-financing is counter to Western values or not.  
VIII CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
There is limited discussion in the Board’s discussion paper on the Sharīʿa-
compliance of murābaḥa products, in particular the treatment of profit mark-
up as interest. One of the reasons for the limited discussion is that Islamic 
finance is still a novel idea in Australia and Islamic banks are yet to be 
established. The Board’s discussion paper was released in late 2010 and no 
further tax reforms have taken place since the release of the Discussion Paper, 
while legislative amendments were made to cater for Islamic finance products 
in the UK as early as 2003. The Board’s discussion paper is limited by a number 
of omissions and unexamined assumptions. First, it contains no discussion by 
the Board about Sharīʿa supervisory boards, and specifically about the 
differences of opinion by Sharīʿa scholars on what constitutes ribā and whether 
‘mark-up’ is a form of ribā. Also, the lack of global expertise on Sharīʿa and 
global finance means that Sharīʿa experts need to be trained and educated on 
global finance and international markets. Second, the Board assumes that there 
is no problem with treating profit mark-up as interest for taxation purposes, 
sets+aAnd+Businesses+fFrom+Overseas+Shariah+Investors%E2%80%99+&ie=utf-8&oe= 
utf-8&gws_rd=cr&ei=HKYpVqmmJsLO0ASVy5HoBQ#>. 
170 Nick Sherry, ‘Board of Taxation to Review Australia’s Tax Laws to Ensure Islamic Finance 
Market can Expand’ (Media Release, No 076, 26 April 2010) <http://ministers.treasury.gov 
.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2010/076.htm&pageID=&min=njsa&Year=&DocT
ype=0>. 
                                                 
298 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 20 NO 2 
because that is the only way that the tax treatment of murābaḥa and 
conventional products will be equal. Third, while the example of the prosperity 
that Islamic finance has brought in the United Kingdom has been a motivating 
factor for the introduction of Islamic finance in Australia, there remains 
considerable debate among Muslim scholars in the UK, many of whom are 
critical of Islamic finance products such as murābaḥa. Further, the Board does 
not discuss case law in the UK, in particular the case of Symphony Gems, where 
Justice Tomlinson rejected the defence that the contract Symphony Gems had 
entered into was not Sharīʿa-compliant in nature. This case is an example of 
how murābaḥ contracts which are not Shariah-compliant may still be enforced 
in Western jurisdictions.   
While a more detailed analysis of the murābaḥa product is needed, there is not 
enough evidence to suggest that murābaḥa financing will necessarily be 
rejected or viewed as not being Sharīʿa-compliant by international Islamic 
investors and the Australian Muslim community. As Saeed notes, although the 
profit mark-up in murābaḥa has been challenged by many as being equivalent 
to interest, the ‘pragmatic approach has persisted’.171 This pragmatic approach 
consists of reading ribā contextually in the Qur’an. Therefore, it is argued by 
those using the contextual approach that ‘mark-up’ is only ribā if it leads to an 
unjust result. Most international Islamic banks and financial institutions do not 
view the concept of ‘mark-up’ as leading to an unjust result, and thus it is not 
interpreted as ribā. Those who interpret ‘ribā’ more literally and consider 
‘mark-up’ as being equivalent to ribā and clearly prohibited in the Qur’an can 
choose not to participate in murābaḥa transactions. They will, however, be 
disadvantaged unless they formulate a practical alternative for generating cash 
and purchasing products and utilities that, in their opinion, is Sharīʿa-
compliant. In conclusion, it is proposed that, before further legislative reforms 
are introduced in Australia to cater for Islamic finance products, a more 
thorough analysis of the Sharīʿa-compliant nature of products such as 
murābaḥa is required so that any issues in relation to the legitimacy of Islamic 
finance products under Sharīʿa can be addressed. 
 
 
171 Saeed, ‘Adapting Understanding of Riba to Islamic Banking: Some Developments’, above n 
50, 59.  
                                                 
